

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CRIMINAL NO. 16-cr-20217
Plaintiff, HON. VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

V.

D-1 WILLYE PEARSALL.

Defendant.

HON VICTORIA A ROBEE

HON. VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

GOVERNMENT'S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

The United States of America, by and through its attorneys, Barbara L. McQuade, United States Attorney, and J. Michael Buckley and Frances Lee Carlson, Assistant United States Attorneys, submits that for the reasons provided below, a sentence of 24 to 30 months' imprisonment, which takes into account the defendant's cooperation, is sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Plea

On June 14, 2016, the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to commit federal program bribery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 666(a)(1)(B). Pearsall's guilty plea arises from her participation in a conspiracy to accept illegal kickback payments from school supplies vendor and co-conspirator, Norman Shy. The plea agreement recommended the guideline range to be 30 to 37 months, based on a total offense level 19 and a criminal history category I. Despite the agreement of the parties, Pearsall argues in her sentencing memorandum that the loss amount is less, and thus, the guideline range is lower. This is contrary to what was agreed upon after months of plea negotiations.

According to the cooperation provisions of the plea agreement, on August 22, 2016, the government filed a motion for downward departure recommending a sentence within the range of 24 to 30 months. In the event that Pearsall persists in breaching the terms of the plea agreement by contesting the agreed-upon guidelines, the government will consider withdrawing the motion for downward departure.

B. Facts

Defendant Willye Pearsall was employed by Detroit Public Schools (“DPS”) as the Principal of Thurgood Marshall Elementary School (“Thurgood Marshall”) from 2005 through 2011. DPS maintained a list of

pre-approved vendors that were authorized to do business with DPS. As part of her duties, Pearsall had the discretion to select vendors from the pre-approved DPS vendor list to procure services and supplies for Thurgood Marshall. Pearsall was responsible for certifying, or causing to be certified, that all goods and services were received by her school, which in turn, would cause DPS to issue payment to the vendor.

Norman Shy, doing business as Allstate Sales, Ronan Enterprises, and R.S. Associates, was a pre-approved DPS vendor of school supplies. Sometime prior to December 2009, Pearsall selected Shy as a vendor for school supplies for Thurgood Marshall. At some point, Pearsall agreed with Shy to submit purchase orders which included goods that she knew were not going to be delivered to Thurgood Marshall and also to knowingly certify fraudulent purchase orders or invoices which included undelivered goods. Pearsall's actions caused DPS to issue payment to Shy for undelivered goods. In exchange, Pearsall would receive kickbacks mostly in the form of checks payable from Shy to "Safety Net Enterprises" or "J & J Youth Services" – both companies that were owned and/or controlled by Pearsall.

Pearsall had Shy write checks to these companies in order to help conceal the kickback payments.

During interviews in both August and October 2015, Pearsall confessed that she accepted approximately \$50,000 in kickbacks from Shy. Contrary to her request in her sentencing memorandum for the Court to determine the loss, she has stipulated to the loss amount as part of the plea agreement. Bank records show that the money Shy paid to Pearsall's companies were mostly transferred to Pearsall's personal bank account or withdrawn by Pearsall as cash. Pearsall spent a portion of the kickbacks at the MGM Casino in Detroit.

II. SENTENCING GUIDELINE CALCULATIONS

As reflected in the plea agreement, the parties anticipated a guideline range of 30 to 37 months based on a total offense level of 19. The probation department calculated a guideline range of 46 to 57 months based on a total offense level of 23. The difference in calculation is due to the fact that the probation department applied a four-level increase pursuant to USSG § 2C1.1(b)(3), reasoning that the offense involved a public official in a high-level decision-making position.

As the Court is aware, on August 22, 2016, the government filed a motion for downward departure recommending a sentence between 24 to 30 months based on Pearsall's cooperation. As a result, if the Court grants the motion, the inconsistency in calculations would likely be moot.

III. SECTION 3553(a) SENTENCING FACTORS

In determining the appropriate sentence, the Court should not simply rely on the Guideline calculations, but should consider all of the factors in the Sentencing Reform Act and, in particular, those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These factors include (i) the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (ii) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense, and (iii) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.

In this case, absent the government's motion for downward departure, a guideline sentence is warranted. However, because the defendant did cooperate with the government, a sentence below the guideline range is appropriate.

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

This fraud on DPS and the children of Detroit was a very serious offense. The struggles of DPS have been well-documented in the media: deplorable building conditions; teacher shortages; severe lack of school supplies and equipment; overcrowded classrooms; lack of funding. The list is long. Pearsall, as principal of Thurgood Marshall, was entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the students at her school were receiving every educational tool and benefit available despite the woefully inadequate resources. Pearsall abused the trust placed in her, and made decisions to do business with vendor Norman Shy, motivated by what she *personally* stood to gain, instead of what was best for her students.

To the extent that Pearsall characterizes her motivation as altruistic, or that she fraudulently accepted kickbacks from Shy to use “for the kids,” that is irrelevant. Although the Sixth Circuit has not confronted this issue, other federal circuits have had the opportunity to address similar arguments. Federal circuit courts have resoundingly declined to consider personal profit motives—or lack thereof—when imposing sentences.

In *United States v. Seacott*, a district court's departure from the recommended guidelines because the defendant's motive was not for "self-gain" was reversed. 15 F.3d 1380, 1386 (7th Cir. 1994). Although the district court reasoned that the guidelines did not adequately take into consideration why a defendant would misapply funds, the Seventh Circuit held that an alleged positive motive was "legally insufficient" to warrant a downward departure. *Id.* at 1387. The Court explained that when the drafters of the Guidelines were concerned with adjustment based on profit motive they were careful to specifically direct courts to consider the defendant's purpose. *Id.*¹ Most importantly, the Court in *Seacott* recognized:

It makes little difference to the[] victims if [defendants] illegally transfer funds to themselves or third parties, or if they pile up the money in the parking lot and burn it. The same amount of money has been taken from the victim no matter what the fate of the funds.

Id.

Other circuits have reached similar conclusions, finding that altruistic motive or lack of pecuniary gain to the defendant is irrelevant in sentencing.

¹ For example, citing the offense "Manufacturing Distributing, Advertising, or Possessing an Eavesdropping Device" which directs the court to consider "[i]f the offense was committed for *pecuniary gain*, increase by 3 levels." U.S.S.G. § 2H3.2(b)(1) (emphasis added).

In *United States v. Corry*, the defendant argued that she did not experience personal gain from the bank fraud she committed since the money was being used to keep a family business afloat. 206 F.3d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 2000).

Again, the Court recognized how irrelevant a charitable motive is: “[T]o the victim, the criminal’s motives are irrelevant. If someone steals your wallet and gives the money in it to the Humane Society, rather than blowing it in Las Vegas, that’s little comfort as you gaze at your empty pocket.” *Id.* at 751. In the Third Circuit, the Court recognized that a defendant is not punished based on who the criminal activity benefits, instead “the Court must focus on the extent of the harm inflicted by the defendant on his victims.” *United States v. Kopp*, 951 F.2d 521, 535-36 (3d Cir. 1991).

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that a failure to personally recoup proceeds of a fraudulent scheme does not “provide a basis for a more lenient sentence.” *United States v. Felder*, 225 F. App’x 423, 424 (8th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, the alleged motive for a crime and who receives the proceeds of a fraudulent scheme is irrelevant. Although a sentencing court can consider any factor when considering a downward departure or variance, the federal circuits have made clear that a defendant’s motive in a crime

should not be grounds for leniency. Instead, courts should focus on the victims of the crime, and not any possible benefactors.

Even if Pearsall was accepting fraudulent kickbacks and using the illegal proceeds to help her school, her alleged charity was only made possible by fraud committed against taxpayers and the Detroit Public School System. Pearsall's attempt to downplay the seriousness of her corrupt acts by claiming she accepted and spent kickbacks on her students ignores the fact that her so-called charitable acts were being directly funded by the crime for which she now stands convicted. This Court should reject Pearsall's claimed motive for accepting fraudulent kickbacks when considering whether to depart or vary from the Guideline range, and in doing so recognize that charity involves giving away one's *own* money, not money that belongs to others. To find otherwise would sanction the notion that corruptly accepting bribes and kickbacks to spend proceeds as one prefers is not a serious offense.

B. History and Characteristics of Defendant Pearsall

Pearsall has no criminal history. The PSR provides a detailed account of Pearsall' personal background.

C. Seriousness of the Offense, Promoting Respect for the Law, Providing Just Punishment, and Affording Adequate Deterrence

Pearsall's corrupt acceptance of kickbacks was not a crime resulting from a single decision or a momentary impulse. She accepted multiple kickbacks, mostly in the form of checks, over a 16-month period. Pearsall's conduct was not spontaneous, but, instead, involved careful coordination and planning, and repeated acts of deceit over a number of months.

In prosecutions such as this, the sentence imposed is important to promote respect for the law. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 666 to "protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence by bribery." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 370 (1983). The sentence imposed should reflect this purpose. Pearsall was a public official, and was entrusted to serve the DPS honestly, with the best interests of her school in mind. The spectacle of a school principal corruptly using her position for her own financial benefit or to manipulate the system does untold damage to the faith of our citizens in the education being provided to their children. Undoubtedly, many members of the community

are wondering how pervasive this type of corruption is in our educational system.

Given the difficulties of uncovering and prosecuting this type of corruption, the deterrent impact of a prison sentence is also important. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the important role that prison sentences have in deterring economic-based crimes in *United States v. Martin* when it recognized that “[b]ecause economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence.” 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006)(internal citations omitted). Especially in a public corruption case, it is important to send a message that this type of conduct will not be tolerated, and that the penalties for committing crimes such as these are severe.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, a sentence of imprisonment within the range of 24 to 30 months, is necessary. Such a sentence would serve to adequately punish the defendant for her actions, while taking into account the substantial assistance she provided to the government. In addition, this

sentence would promote respect for the law and serve as deterrence for others.

The government further requests that the Court order full restitution, as agreed to by the parties in the plea agreement, in the amount of \$50,000 to Detroit Public Schools.

Respectfully submitted,

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Date: August 25, 2016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on Thursday, August 25, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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